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Abstract
We derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage bar-
gaining game à la Hall and Milgrom (2008) under a plausible parameter restriction.
This solution is simple, micro-founded and permits a transparent analysis of the driv-
ing forces of wages. We argue that it can be used in a wide range of economic models
incorporating the search and matching theory of unemployment to simplify the anal-
ysis and obtain more easily interpretable results.
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1 Introduction
The search and matching framework has become an essential tool for the analysis of un-
employment and the labor market. Because search frictions give rise to a surplus that has
to be shared between firms and workers, the private efficiency of employment relationships
is consistent with a broad range of wage setting mechanisms. Hall and Milgrom (2008)
have proposed an increasingly popular alternative to the standard Nash model of wage
determination. It offers the advantage of addressing the so-called Shimer puzzle, namely
the inability of the canonical search and matching model to replicate the volatility of labor
market variables observed in the data. It does so by providing a micro-foundation for wage
rigidity. These authors argue that the threat points of both employers and job seekers are
to delay bargaining rather than terminate it. This tends to insulate wages from outside
conditions in the labor market and make them endogenously rigid.
In the baseline version of this model, an analytical expression for real wages cannot be
derived. As a consequence, introducing it in an otherwise standard search and matching
frictions framework can substantially complexify the analysis. We show that is it possible to
circumvent this problem and derive a reduced form wage equation from an alternating-offer
wage bargaining game à la Hall and Milgrom (2008) by imposing a plausible parameter
restriction. More precisely, we impose that the probability of breakdown in bargaining is
equal to the separation rate. In our specification, wages are partially connected to outside
labor market conditions through the difference between the current and the expected val-
ues of unemployment. On the one hand, an increase in the current value of unemployment
leads to an increase in the threat point of workers in bargaining and puts upward pres-
sure on wages. On the other hand, an increase in the future value of unemployment leads
workers to value more current employment and temper their wage claims. We provide a
detailed account of how our simple wage equation could be used in a wide range of mod-
els incorporating the search and matching theory of unemployment to simplify the analysis.
The note is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a standard search and matching
model of the labor market. Section 3 presents the alternating-offer bargaining game and
derives the analytical solution for the wage. Section 4 analyzes the driving forces of wages
and discusses how our simple expression could be used in the literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a discrete time version of the search and matching model of Pissarides (2000).
Firms and workers must match in the labor market in order to become productive. Matches
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are formed according to a constant returns to scale production function mt = µuαt v
1−α
t
where u is the number of job seekers, v the number of open vacancies and 0 < α < 1.
Unemployed workers find a job with probability f(θ) = mt
ut
and vacancies are filled at a
rate q(θ) = mt
vt
where θ = v
u
is a measure of labor market tightness. At the beginning of
each period, a fraction s of existing employment relationships is exogenously destroyed.
Matches formed in one period become operational in the next period. The law of motion
of employment nt is accordingly given by:
nt = (1− s)nt−1 +mt−1 (1)
Workers are risk neutral and do not have access to financial markets. They can be either
employed or unemployed. The values Wt and Ut associated with those two states are given
by:
Wt = wt + e
−r [(1− s)EtWt+1 + sEtUt+1] (2)
Ut = b+ e
−r [f(θt)EtWt+1 + (1− f(θt))EtUt+1] (3)
where r is the discount rate and β = 1
1+r
≈ e−r is the discount factor. When employed,
workers receive a wage wt and can expect to remain employed with probability 1−s. When
unemployed, workers receive the flow value of unemployment b and can expect to find a job
with probability f(θt). Firms operate with a constant returns to scale production function
yt = ztnt where zt, the state of technology, evolves according to an AR(1) process. They
must pay a cost c to post a vacancy. The firm’s values of a filled and an unfilled vacancy
Jt and Vt are thus given by:
Jt = zt − wt + e−r [(1− s)EtJt+1 + sEtVt+1] (4)
Vt = −c+ e−r [q(θt)EtJt+1 + (1− q(θt))EtVt+1] (5)
Free entry in the posting of vacancies implies Vt = 0. Therefore the job creation equation
is:
c
q(θt)
= e−rEtJt+1 (6)
3 The alternating-offer wage bargain
Wages are determined according to a sequential bargaining game à la Binmore et al. (1986).
Hall and Milgrom (2005) note that “many rounds of bargaining can occur within each period
of search and employment”. In line with this intuition, we assume that each period is
divided into sub-periods during which bargaining takes place. The time interval separating
one sub-period from another is τ . Firms begin the game by making an offer w to the
worker. If the offer is accepted, the game ends. If the offer is rejected, the game goes on to
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the next sub-period when the worker makes a counter-offer w′ to the firm. During this time
interval, the firm incurs a flow cost γτ while the worker receives flow benefits bτ . Moreover,
before the worker makes his counter-offer, negotiations can breakdown with hazard δ. In
this case, the worker gets U whereas the firm gets nothing. Otherwise, the game continues
to the next sub-period. In this setting, it is optimal for each party to always make a just
acceptable offer to the other side. Thus, the following equations govern the game:1
Wwt = bτ + e
−rτ
[
(1− e−δτ )Ut + e−δτWw′t
]
(7)
Jw
′
t = −γτ + e−(r+δ)τJwt (8)
Solving equations (7) and (8) for w (or equivalently for w′) and letting τ → 0, we obtain
the following sharing rule:2
Wt − b
r + δ
− δUt
r + δ
= Jt +
γ
r + δ
(9)
This equation is similar to equation (17) in Hall and Milgrom (2005). Under the assumption
that the probability of breakdown during bargaining δ is equal to the separation rate s,
and after using this sharing rule along with equations (2) and (4), we obtain:
wt =
1
2
[
zt + β(b+ γ) +
δ
r + δ
(Ut − EtUt+1)
]
(10)
This simple wage equation is our main result. Hall and Milgrom (2008) set δ in order to
match the volatility of the unemployment rate. The employer’s cost of delay, γ, plays a
similar role than δ in that it influences directly the volatility of unemployment. When γ
is high, firms’ surplus is small and changes significantly in percentage terms in response
to shocks. As a result, stochastic variations in technology lead to important movements
in job creation and unemployment. The converse reasoning holds when γ is low. Since
knowledge about both the values of γ and δ is limited, we believe it is equivalent to fix one
to a particular value and let the other adjust to match the volatility of the unemployment
rate. Unlike Hall and Milgrom (2008), we choose δ = s and propose to fix γ to match
the volatility of the unemployment rate. This calibration strategy has the advantage of
enabling us to derive a simple analytical expression for the wage. It also represents an
intermediate choice in the literature. Hall and Milgrom (2008) obtain a probability of
breakdown that is five times as high as the separation rate whereas Christiano et al. (2013)
estimate a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model encompassing an
alternating-offer model of wage-setting on U.S. data and find a value of the probability of
breakdown that is lower than the separation rate.
1We follow strictly Hall and Milgrom (2005) when defining the equations governing the game.
2See Appendix A.
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4 The wage equation: potential use
4.1 The steady-state equation
In steady-state, equation (10) collapses to
w =
1
2
[z + β(b+ γ)] (11)
The complete isolation of the wage from labor market conditions in that case has a simple
intuitive explanation. On one hand, an increase in the value of unemployment U leads to
an increase in the threat point of workers in bargaining and puts an upward pressure on
wages. On the other hand, an increase in U leads to an increase in the value of employment
W for the worker. As workers value more employment, they accept lower wages. When
δ = s, those two effects cancel out. Mortensen and Nágypál (2007) obtain a similar ex-
pression within the context of an alternating-offer game with no probability of breakdown
during bargaining by imposing that the separation rate s is equal to zero. We show that it
is possible to find a simple analytical solution for the wage in a more realistic setup. We
allow for a positive probability of breakdown during bargaining and do not impose that
the separation rate is equal to zero. A similar result was also uncovered by Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2014) in recent and independent work.
We believe equation (11) could be of great use in articles incorporating a steady-state
labor market frictions model. In that type of framework, when wages are determined
according to a generalized Nash bargaining game, the job creation equation becomes non-
linear in labor market tightness. One needs to solve for it numerically and this rules out
the possibility of obtaining analytical results. This problem does not arise when using our
simple wage solution. Because wages do not depend on labor market tightness in equation
(11), analytical expressions for all variables in the model can readily be obtained.
4.2 The dynamic case
In the more general dynamic case, the wage is not completely isolated from labor market
conditions as Ut and EtUt+1 may differ (see equation (10)). Consider that the value of
unemployment increases both today and in the future in response to a positive technology
shock. In the event that Ut − EtUt+1 > 0, the wage moderating effect of an increase in
the value of employment will be more than offset by the effect arising from the stronger
bargaining position of the worker and the improvement in labor market conditions will put
upward pressure on wages. When Ut − EtUt+1 < 0, the inverse reasoning holds and the
improvement in labor market conditions depresses wages.
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In recent years, a large literature has incorporated the search and matching theory of
unemployment in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) to study, among
others things, the impact of fiscal and monetary policies on the labor market and the joint
dynamics of inflation and unemployment. As pointed out in the introduction, when wages
are Nash-bargained, these models embedding a search structure are unable to account for
the volatility of labor market variables observed in U.S. data. Several fixes, including wage
rigidity, have been proposed to solve this problem. Because of its micro-founded nature
and its ability to generate wage rigidity endogenously, the credible bargaining model of
wage-setting is becoming increasingly popular in the literature. However, in the standard
setup proposed by Hall and Milgrom (2008), an analytical expression for wages cannot be
derived. This has an undesirable consequence; when this model of wage-setting is used, it is
generally impossible to find analytical and easily interpretable results. Some authors have
circumvented this problem by using simple ad-hoc wage equations which preserve the main
feature of the setup, that is, the partial isolation of wages from labor market conditions.
In Jung and Kuester (2011), wages are a weighted average of the technological level and
the fixed outside option of workers during bargaining and are fully insulated from labor
market conditions. We nest their specification when δ = s = 0 and β = 1. Hall (2014)
justifies the introduction of a parameter that controls the role of labor market tightness in
the Nash-bargained wage equation by invoking the logic of the alternating-offer bargaining
game. Although his equation cannot be formally derived from a bargaining game, a low
value for this parameter corresponds to a low value for the probability of breakdown in the
credible bargaining model.
We believe our wage solution could permit a wider use of the credible bargaining frame-
work in these dynamic models. In equation (10), the expression is both micro-founded and
simple to use, and the driving forces of wages are transparent. We argue that since knowl-
edge about the values of the probability of breakdown in bargaining δ and the employer’s
cost of delay γ is limited, fixing one of these parameters and letting the other vary to
match key labor market moments is equivalent. We fix δ = s and let γ vary to obtain the
advantage of the analytical solution. This strategy has an unanticipated side benefit. In
the appendix, we show that when calibrating the model to standard values and matching
the standard deviation of the component of unemployment driven by productivity as in
Hall and Milgrom (2008), we obtain a short-run elasticity of wages with respect to labor
productivity of about 0.8, in line with empirical estimates reported in Haefke et al. (2013).3
This is because the Ut − EtUt+1 term reacts in a pro-cyclical way to technology shocks.
Thus, on top of its simplicity, our wage equation is consistent with important labor market
facts.
3See Appendix B.
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5 Conclusion
We derive a reduced form wage equation from an alternating-offer wage bargaining game
la Hall and Milgrom (2008) under a plausible parameter restriction. Our simple equation
connects wages to outside labor market conditions through the difference between the
current and the future values of unemployment. It can easily be used in studies wishing to
obtain analytical results, permits a transparent analysis of the driving forces of wages, and
is consistent with key labor market facts
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A Derivations of (9), (10) and (11)
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game satisfies:
Wwt = bτ + e
−rτ
[(
1− e−δτ)Ut + e−δτWw′t ] (12)
and
Jw
′
t = −γτ + e−(r+δ)τJwt (13)
with
Wwt = wt + e
−r [(1− s)EtWt+1 + sEtUt+1] (14)
Ww
′
t = w
′
t + e
−r [(1− s)EtWt+1 + sEtUt+1] (15)
Jw
′
t = zt − w′t + e−r(1− s)EtJt+1 (16)
Jwt = zt − wt + e−r(1− s)EtJt+1 (17)
because Vt = Vt+1 = 0. Plugging (14) and (15) in (12) leads to:
wt +
[
1− e−(r+δ)τ] e−r [(1− s)EtWt+1 + sEtUt+1] = bτ + e−rτ (1− e−δτ)Ut + e−(r+δ)τw′t
Likewise, integrating equations (16) and (17) in equation (13) gives:
w′t = γτ +
[
1− e−(r+δ)τ] zt + [1− e−(r+δ)τ] e−r(1− s)EtJt+1 + e−(r+δ)τwt
Combining the two equations above and letting τ → 0, we find:
2wt + e
−r [(1− s)EtWt+1 + sEtUt+1] = b+ γ
r + δ
+
δUt
r + δ
+ zt + e
−r(1− s)EtJt+1
because, when τ → 0, e−aτ = 1−aτ with a a constant. Noting thatWwt = Wt and Jwt = Jt,
we get:
Wt − b
r + δ
− δUt
r + δ
= Jt +
γ
r + δ
(18)
Introducing the expressions of Wt and Jt in (18) leads to:
2wt + β(1− s) [EtWt+1 − EtJt+1] = zt + b+ γ
r + δ
+
δUt
r + δ
− βsEtUt+1
since e−r ≈ β = 1
1+r
. Using the sharing rule, we obtain:
EtWt+1 − EtJt+1 = δEtUt+1
r + δ
+
b+ γ
r + δ
Using the above equation and (18), we have:
2wt = zt +
[1− β(1− s)] (b+ γ)
(r + δ)
− δUt
r + δ
−
[
βs+
β(1− s)δ
r + δ
]
EtUt+1
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that is:
wt =
zt
2
+
(r + s)(b+ γ)
2(r + δ)(1 + r)
− δUt
2(r + δ)
− (sr + δ)EtUt+1
2(r + δ)(1 + r)
If δ = s then:
wt =
1
2
[
z + β(b+ γ) +
δ (Ut − EtUt+1)
r + δ
]
Last, at steady state, EtUt+1 = Ut = U implying that:
w =
1
2
[z + β(b+ γ)]
B Calibration exercise
We calibrate the model in a conventional manner. We take one period to be a month.
The discount factor is set to β = 0.99, which yields an interest rate of 4% annually. The
elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment is assumed to be α = 0.5, in line with
estimates in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000). Following Shimer (2005), the separation
rate is set to 0.034 and the steady-state job finding rate to 0.45. Given a steady-state labor
market tightness of 0.7, matching efficiency µ is then determined through steady-state
relationships. We set the flow value of unemployment to 0.71 and choose the employer’s
cost of delay γ to match a standard deviation of the component of unemployment driven by
productivity of 0.68 percentage points, following Hall and Milgrom (2008). Vacancy posting
costs c are then determined through steady-state relationships. Finally, we use standard
values for the autoregressive parameter and the standard deviation of the technology shock,
ρ = 0.951/3and σz = 0.0075. Figure 1 presents the impulse response functions of selected
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variables to a positive technology shock. The short-run elasticity of wages with respect to
labor productivity is computed in each period by using the following formula εw,zt =
wt−w
w
zt−z
z
with w and z being the steady-state values of wages and technology. It is approximately
equal to 0.84 from period 1 to period 30.
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